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may be considered a prisoner21 in one state and a guest2 2 in another.
The unsoundness of treating the unwilling rider as a guest within the
meaning of the automobile guest statutes becomes apparent when the
rider's freedom is viewed as being unlawfully restrained without his
consent. Regardless of the possible alternate remedy of false imprisonment,
a driver should not be allowed to negligently injure a passenger without
incurring liability when the passenger is riding against his will.
Daniel H. James
DIVORCE - LIABILITY OF THE HUSBAND'S
ESTATE TO PAY ALIMONY
The plaintiff sought an order requiring the ancillary administrator of
her deceased husband's estate to make alimony payments. The divorce decree
and prior property settlement provided that payinents "would cease upon
her death or remarriage." Held, where the decree or property settlement
expressly provides for the continuance of the payments "until the death of
the wife or her remarriage" the husband's estate remains liable. Johnson
v. Every, 93 So.2d 390 (Fla. 1957).
Under the common law, the obligation to pay alimony is regarded as
a personal one which terminates upon the death of either spouse.' In the
absence of a statute2 or an agreement between the parties, the rule adopted
by the majority of courts in the case of an absolute divorce is that the
death of the husband terminates the right of the wife to receive alimony
payments.8
20. Cieplinski v. Severn, 269 Mass. 261, 168 N.E. 722 (1929) (driving past street
where plaintiff demanded to be let out of automobile entitled plaintiff to at least nominaldamages for false imprisonment); Jacobson v. Sorenson, 183 Minn. 425, 236 N.W. 922(1931) (taking plaintiff for an involuntary ride for the purpose of "telling her off"
constituted false imprisonment).
21. Ibid.
22. Akins v. Hemphill, 33 \Vash.2d 735, 207 P.2d 195 (1949).
1. 19 C. J. Divorce § 633 (1920).
2. Murphy v. Shelton, 183 Wash. 180, 48 P.2d 247 (1935); Hale v. Hale,
108 W. Va. 337, 150 S.E. 748 (1929).
3. Roberts v. Iliggens, 122 Cal. App. 170, 9 P.2d 517 (1932); International
Trust Co. v. Liebhardt, Ili Colo. 208, 139 P.2d 264 (1943) (dictum); Parsons v.
Parsons' Estate, 70 Colo. 333, 201 Pac. 559 (1921); Underwood v. Underwood, 64
So.2d 281 (Fla. 1953); Berry v. Berry, 208 Ga. 285, 66 S.E.2d 336 (1951); Kramp v.
Kramp, 2 Ill. App. 2d 17, 117 N.E.2d 859 (1954); Re Yoss Estate, 237 Iowa 1092,
24 N.W.2d 399 (1946); Succession of Carter, 32 So.2d 44 (La. 1947); Poor v. Poor,
237 Mo. App. 74, 167 S.W.2d 471 (1942); N.h 4 orth, 339 Mo. 1226, 100S.W.2d 582 (1936 SW Robertson v4 2 No. 455, 190 At. 709 (1937); ReCrimley's Estate, 26 Misc. 901, 107 N.Y.S.2d 129 (Surr. Ct. 1951); Platt v. Davies,
82 Ohio App. 182, 77 N.E.2d 486 (1947); Snouffer v. Snouffer, 132 Ohio St. 617,
9 N.E.2d 621 (1937); Prime v. Prime, 172 Ore. 34, 139 P.2d 550 (1943); Re Watrous's
Estate, 10 Pa. 1. & C. 639 (1927), aff'd, 95 Pa. Super 11 (1927); Brandon v. Brandon,
175 Tenn. 463, 135 S.W.2d 929 (1940); Wilson v. Wilson, 195 Va. 1060, 81 S.E.Zd
605 (1954).
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CASES NOTED
Where the court has the power to extend alimony payments beyond
the life of the husband, the court generally will exercise such power only
where there is an intention to so bind the estate.4 It is well settled that
if the parties by consent or property settlement agreement specifically state
alimony is to be binding on the heirs, executors or administrators, such
an intention will prevail.6 The broader view determines whether alimony
continues after the death of the husband by reference to the language0
of the divorce decree and the surrounding circumstances.7
The difficulty arises where the divorce decree provides for the payment
of alimony to the wife during the remainder of her life or until her death
or remarriage or similar expressions.8 In Foster v. Foster," the Supreme
Court of Virginia held that the words "until her death or remarriage"
embodied in a divorce decree did not, expressly or by fair implication,
show an intent to extend the payment of alimony beyond the husband's
death. Cases in other jurisdictions involving the same or similar expressions
have reached the same result,' 0 or the courts have construed the expressions
by themselves to mean the contrary.1 In Illinois the clauses "for so long
as she may be and remain sole and unmarried"' 2 and "during the remainder
4. Garber v. Robitshek, 226 Minn. 398, 33 N.W.2d 30 (1948); Masters v.
Masters, 155 Neb. 569, 52 N.W.2d 802 (1952); Snouffer v. Snouffer, 132 Ohio St.
617, 9 N.E.2d 621 (1937); Brandon v. Brandon, 175 Tenn. 463, 135 S.W.2d 929 (1940).
Contra, Farrington v. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 280 Mass. 121, 181 N.E.779
(1932).
5. Daggett v. Commissioner, 128 F.2d 568 (9th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S.
673 (1942); Roberts v. Higgens, 122 Cal. App. 170, 9 P.2d 517 (1932); Parsons v.
Parsons' Estate, 70 Colo. 333, 201 Pac. 559 (1921); Allen v. Allen, 111 Fla. 733,
150 So.237 (1933); Southard v. Southard, 262 Mass. 278, 159 N.E.512 (1928); Re
Grimley's Estate, 200 Misc. 901, 107 N.Y.S.2d 129 (Surr. Ct. 1951); Babcock v.
Babcock, 147 Misc. 900, 265 N.Y. Supp. 470 (Sup. Ct. 1933), aff'd, 239 App. Div.
884, 265 N.Y. Supp. 474 (4th Dep't. 1933), motion granted, 263 N.Y. 665, 189
N.E. 747 (1934); Johns v. Johns, 44 App. Div. 533, 60 N.Y. Supp. 865 (2nd Dep't
1899), aff'd, 166 N.Y. 613, 59 N.E.1124 (1901).
6. Re Mesmer's Estate, 94 Cal. App. 97, 270 Pac. 732 (1928) ("during her
lifetime or until she remarries"); Parker v. Parker, 193 Cal. 478, 225 Pac. 447 (1924)
("during the remainder of her natural life"); Ramsay v. Sims, 209 Ga. 228, 71
S.E.2d 639 (1952) ("for her natural life or until she remarries").
7. Re Mesmer's Estate, 94 Cal. App. 97, 270 Pao. 732 (1928); Mullen v. Mullen,
246 Iowa 1255, 69 N.W.2d 420 (1955); Masters v. Masters, 155 Neb. 569, 52 N.W.2d
802 (1952); Billow v. Billow, 97 Ohio App. 277, 125 N.E.2d 558 (1953); Cooke v.
Cooke, 208 Misc. 591, 144 N.Y.S.2d 386 (Sup. Ct. 1955); Re Seton Porter's Estate,
208 Misc. 611, 137 N.Y.S.2d 271 (Surr. Ct. 1954); Re Baratta's Estate, 199 Misc.
246, 102 N.Y.S.2d 776 (Surr. Ct. 1951); aft'd, 112 N.Y.S.2d 493 (Sup. Ct. 1952);
Lepseh v. Lepscb, 275 App. Div. 412, 90 N.Y.S.2d 157 (1949); White v. WVhite,
210 S.C. 336, 42 S.E.2d 537 (1947).
8. Johnson v. Even', 93 So.2d 390 (Fla. 1957) (dissenting opinion).
9. 195 Va. 102, 77 S.E.2d 471 (1953),
10. Mullen v. Mullen, 246 Iowa 1255, 69 N.W.2d 420 (1955) ("so long as she
shall live"); Re Seton Porter's Estate, 208 Misc. 611, 137 N.Y.S.2d 271 (Surr. Ct.
1954) ("during her lifetime"); Billow v. Billow, 97 Ohio App. 277, 125 N.E.2d 558
(1953) ("until her death or remarriage").
11. Wise Estate, 99 Cal. 562, 64 P.2d 594 (1937); Wides v. Wides, 300 Ky.
344, 188 S.W.2d 471 (1945); Farrington v. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 280
Mass. 121, 181 N.E. 779 (1932); Duriand v. Syracuse Trust Co., 230 App. Div. 786,
244 N.Y. Supp. 653 (2nd Dep't 1930); Jennings v. First Nat. Bank of Williamson,
116 W. Va. 409, 180 S.E.772 (1935).
12. Storey v. Storey, 125 Ill. 608, 18 N.E.329 (1888).
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of her natural life or until she remarries"'" embodied within a divorce decree
were held to bind the husband's estate. In neither of the above Illinois
cases was there any express language that the alimony was to be a charge
against the deceased husband's estate.
In both Florida cases cited as being applicable in the instant case,
Allen v. Allen H and Undenvood v. Underwood,'5 there was a clear agree-
ment on the part of the husband to bind his personal representatives after
his death. In the instant case, however, it was held that the expressioni
"until her death or remarriage" in and of itself bound the husband's estate.
The majority of the court was not without support in their decision,",
but the dissent indicated that the stated expression could not bind the
estate of the husband unless the intent was expressly stated in the divorce
decree or could be implied from the surrounding circumstances.
Both the majority and dissenting opinions seem to agree on the law
involved. The difficulty arises in interpreting the intent of the parties as
expressed by the clause "until her death or remarriage" embodied within
the decree. The majority opinion implied an obligation upon the husband's
estate from the clause itself, rather than looking to the true intent of the
parties. It is submitted that the expression "until the death of the wife or
her remarriage" does not warrant such an interpretation. In order to bind
the husband's estate there should be an express written agreement between
the parties. Although this may prove harsh at times, it will eliminate future
litigation by compelling the parties to reduce their agreement to writing
where there is an actual intent to bind the husabud's estate.
MAX SPJEGELMAN
CRIMINAL LAW - CONSPIRACY 
- PARTICIPATION
OF STATE AGENT
The defendants were convicted of conspiring to violate gambling
statutes with one who was an agent of the County Solicitor and acting
in his official capacity to obtain evidence of such violations. Held, where
an essential part of a criminal act is to be performed by a government
agent acting in the line of duty, persons conspi.ring with such agent and
13. Ii re Estate kuclhenbecker, 4 I11. App.2d 314, 124 N.E.2d 52 (1955).
14. 111 Fla. 733, 150 So. 237 (1933) (where the agreement provided that in the
event the death of the husband before the death of his ex-wife, his heirs, executors,
and administrators should pay said alimony).
15. 64 So.2d 281 (Fla. 1953) (where it was provided in the decree that alimony
payments should continue during the life of the wife without any diminution or
cessation).
16. Cases cited note 11: sntpra.
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